

Message Text

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ACTION PM-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 CIAE-00 INR-09 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03

RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 H-02 NSC-10 SS-14

IO-12 OIC-04 T-03 AEC-11 AECE-00 ACDA-19 OMB-01 RSR-01

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O R 201145 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3969

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BONN 4047

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW, NATO, PFOR

SUBJ: MBFR: VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY FRG DISARMAMENT

COMMISSIONER ROTH

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

REF: BONN 2513

SUMMARY: DURING HIS FEB 21-22 VISIT TO WASHINGTON, FRG
DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH WISHES TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND
GAIN US THINKING ON: (A) SUBSTANCE AND TIMING OF VIENNA MIT;
(B) TIMING FOR BILATERAL AND ALLIED ELABORATION OF WESTERN
POSITIONS IN INITIAL AUTUMN 1973 ROUND OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS;
(C) USEFULNESS OF CONCEPT " PHASED INTEGRAL PROGRAM" AS
GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEGOTIATION OPTIONS OF A FIRST MBFR
ROUND; (D) POSSIBLE OR DESIRABLE DURATION OF A FIRST MBFR
NEGOTIATION ROUND: AND (E) ELABORATION OF A POSSIBLE DIVISION OF
LABOR BETWEEN US, UK AND FRG IN PREPARING CONCRETE NEGOTIATION
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OPTIONS. ROTH'S MAIN GOAL IN WASHINGTON TALKS IS TO GAIN IMPRESSION OF BROAD US POLICY GOALS CONCERNING MBFR AND TIMEFRAME CONTEMPLATED BY USG FOR MBFR ENTERPRISE. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF ROTH'S " TALKING POINTS" AND (IN PARENTHESIS) ROTH'S COMMENTS TO EMBOFF ON THESE " TALKING POINTS".
END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT

1. SUBSTANCE AND TIMING OF VIENNA MIT. WE SHOULD TRY TO END THE PRELIMINARY TALKS IN VIENNA IF POSSIBLE BY THE END OF APRIL 1973 IN ORDER TO HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE PREPARATION OF A COMMON POSITION PAPER FOR ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS AND COMMON TEXT IN THE NATO COUNCIL. THE TALKS SHOULD THEREFORE BE LIMITED TO THE POINTS WHICH MUST NECESSARILY BE CLARIFIED IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO BEGIN WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER/ BEGINNING OF OCTOBER 1973. (ROTH HAD ALREADY INDICATED TO EMBOFF --- SEE BONN 3574 --- THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR THE ABOVE REASONS TO LIMIT THE MBFR AGENDA TO THREE POINTS, NAMELY, THE PHASED APPROACH, CONSTRAINTS, AND SIZE AND METHOD OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED
IN NEGOTIATIONS. ROTH INDICATED TO EMBOFF MARCH 19 THAT HE MIGHT EVEN BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ONE POINT AGENDA WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO A DESCRIPTION OF THE TALKS, FOR EXAMPLE, " LIMITATION OF ACTIVITIES, LEVEL AND REDUCTION OF FORCES". WITHOUT REPLYING ON NECESSARY SCOPE OF AGENDA, EMBOFF TOLD ROTH THAT ANY DESCRIPTION
PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE TERM " REDUCTIONS".)

WHICH ARE, IN THE AMERICAN VIEW, THE MINIMAL CONDITIONS ON WHICH AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED IN VIENNA?

WHICH TACTICS SHOULD THE NATO PARTNERS IN VIENNA UTILIZE IN THE FORMULATION OF A WORK PROGRAM IN ORDER TO AVOID A RENEWED CONTROVERSIAL, SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION?

HERE CLARIFICATION WOULD APPEAR TO BE NECESSARY AS TO WHAT CHARACTER THE FIRST NEGOTIATING PHASE BEGINNING IN AUTUMN 1973 SHOULD HAVE --- EXPLORATIONS OVER SUBSTANTIVE BASIC POSITIONS OR ALREADY A DISCUSSION OF NEGOTIATING OPTIONS? (ROTH HAS MADE CLEAR THAT FRG STRONGLY FAVORS LIMITING 1973 MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO " EXPLORATION OVER SUBSTANTIVE BASIC POSITIONS", WITH DISCUSSION OF ACTUAL NEGOTIATION OPTIONS STARTING ONLY NEXT SPRING AFTER THE ALLIANCE HAS WORKED OUT ITS POSITIONS. ROTH TELLS US BRITISH
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ARE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT ENTERING SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE ALLIES PERFECT THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS.)

2. TIMING FOR BILATERAL AND ALLIED ELABORATION OF WESTERN
POSITIONS IN INITIAL AUTUMN 1973 ROUND OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

A. IS THE USG OF THE VIEW THAT THE NATO MINISTERIAL
MEETING IN EARLY JUNE 1973 SHOULD AGREE ON A POSITION PAPER FOR THE
FIRST NEGOTIATION PHASE?

B. WHAT CAN STILL BE ACHIEVED INSIDE NATO BY THE
JUNE 1973 MINISTERIAL? --- APPROVAL OF BASIC POSITIONS OR ALREADY
AGREEMENT OF CERTAIN NEGOTIATION OPTIONS? WHAT SHOULD HAVE
PRIORITY?

C. WHEN CAN ONE COUNT ON THE USG BEING READY AND IN A POSITION
TO DISCUSS, BILATERALLY AND/ OR IN NATO, AMERICAN BASIC POSITIONS
AND NEGOTIATING GOALS FOR A FIRST NEGOTIATION ROUND (IN THE SENSE
OF ROUNDS OF SLT- I TALKS)? (ROTH TOLD EMBOFF HE COULD IMAGINE
THAT THE US MIGHT NOT BE READY TO HOLD SUCH ALLIED OR EVEN BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS BEFORE THE SOVIETS DEFINITELY ACCEPTED THE DATE TO
OPEN AUTUMN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRG MBFR
POSITIONS REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE OF AT LEAST BROAD US POLITICAL
GOALS IN MBFR, ROTH PREFERS SIMPLY TO SHORTEN MIT AND TRIM MBFR
AGENDA IN ORDER TO ASSURE MORE TIME WITHIN ALLIANCE FOR SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION BEFORE START OF AUTUMN NEGOTIATIONS.)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BONN 4047

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3. USEFULNESS OF CONCEPT " PHASED INTEGRAL PROGRAM" AS GUIDELINE
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEGOTIATION OPTIONS OF A FIRST MBFR ROUND.

A. IS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT STILL OF THE VIEW THAT MBFR
SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED AS A LONG RANGE PROCESS AND IN A PHASED
INTEGRAL

NEGOTIATION PROGRAM IN ORDER STEP- BY- STEP DECISIVELY TO REDUCE THE
DANGERS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE?

B. WHICH GOALS DOES THE USG INTEND TO REACH IN A FIRST
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NEGOTIATION ROUND (MBFR- I) IN THE NEXT YEARS?

C. IS THE CONCEPT OF THE " PHASED APPROACH", IN THE AMERICNA
VIEW, AN AGREED GUIDELINE THAT WILL ALLOW THE SPECIAL AMERICAN
INTERESTS TO BE SUFFICIENTLY TAKEN ACCOUNT OF?

D. DOES THE CONCEPT OF THE " PHASED APPROACH" PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
FLEXIBILITY TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION IN A BALANCED WAY OF THE INTERESTS
OF BOTH INDIVIDUAL ALLIANCE PARTNERS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE TOTAL
ALLIANCE? (ROTH STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE PHASED APPROACH WAS
DESIGNED TO TAKE PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF USG REQUIREMENTS WITH
CONGRESS
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE GERMANS AND OTHER
EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO PARA 26 OF THE
APRIL 1, 1971 GERMAN PAPER ON THE PHASED APPROACH; THAT PARA MADE
THE
POINT THAT THE FIVE PHASED GERMAN APPROACH WAS SUFFICIENTLY
FLEXIBLE TO PERMIT REORDERING OR COMBINING OF VARIOUS PHASES TO MEET

REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE AND ITS PARTICULAR PARTNERS.)

THE PRIMARY GERMAN INTEREST IN A FIRST NEGOTIATION ROUND IS AS FOLLOWS: HANDLING THE CONSTRAINTS PROBLEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO TEST WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO AGREE TO BINDING OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA OF MOVEMENT LIMITATIONS AND TO LIMITED DURATION AGREEMENTS SUFFICIENT TO ASSURE THAT IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (MBFR- II) CERTAIN OPTIONS FOR SUCH A SECOND ROUND (FOR EXAMPLE, REDUCTION OF INDIGENOUS FORCES) WOULD BE KEPT OPEN. (ROTH EMPHASIZED THAT GOAL IN FIRST ROUND OF MBFR- I WOULD BE SIMPLY TO EXPLORE SOVIET READINESS TO CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS RATHER THAN TO ATTEMPT SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION ON SUBJECT. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BOUNDARY CROSSING WITHIN WESTERN OR EASTERN ZONE. STATIONED INDIGENOUS PROBLEM TREATED FURTHER BY SEPTTEL-- NOTAL.)

4. POSSIBLE OR DESIRABLE DURATION OF A FIRST MBFR NEGOTIATION ROUND. UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE USG ALSO CONCEPTUALIZES MBFR AS A LONG TERM NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND CONSIDERS THE CONCEPT OF THE " PHASED APPROACH" TO BE APPROPRIATE:

(A) WHAT IS THE USG THINKING FOR THE POSSIBLE OR DESIRABLE DURATION OF A FIRST NEGOTIATION ROUND?

(B) WHICH FACTORS WOULD APPEAR TO BE OF GREAT WEIGHT IN CONSIDERING TIMING?

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5. DIVISION OF LABOR. THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO ARRANGE BETWEEN (THE US, UK AND FRG) A DIVISION OF LABOR IN THE TREATMENT OF CERTAIN MBFR BUILDING BLOCKS.

SO FAR AS WE KNOW, THE BRITISH INTEND ABOVE ALL TO CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH " CONSTRAINTS" AND " NUCLEAR MIXED PACKAGES". WE ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE FURTHER ELABORATION OF AN FLA. WE ASSUME THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTENT AND THE METHODS OF THE REDUCTION F STATIONED FORCES, BUT WE DEPART FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE QUESTIONS

OF VERIFICATION AND CONSTRAINTS WILL ALSO BE EXAMINED.

SUCH A DIVISION OF LABOR WOULD ONLY BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND SAVE WORK IF TIMELY EXCHANGES AND CONTINUOUS COOPERATION ASSURED THAT DETAILED ELEMENTS AND BUILDING BLOCKS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATION OPTIONS WOULD BE WORKED OUT IN INTERACTION SO THAT THE PARTNERS WOULD BE MUTUALLY INFLUENCED BY EACH OTHERS WORK AND SO THAT THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION FROM

ONE ANOTHER. END TEXT
HILLENBRAND

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